Past research showed that East Asians' belief in holism was expressed as their tendencies to include background facial emotions into the evaluation of target faces more than North Americans. However, this pattern can be interpreted as North Americans' tendency to 
Given these North American ways of being a person, it is possible to assume that North Americans would expect people to have strong control over the production of facial emotions that represent their internal states of mind, and to express unambiguous information about the self without being affected by other people. In other words, individuals are considered as causal agents of their facial emotions. Therefore, when North Americans evaluate the intensity of the target's facial expressions, they would downplay the salient facial emotions of background people, regarding them as distinct from those of the target person. That is, people may share a belief in which the target facial emotions and surrounding others' facial emotions are independent of or impervious to each other. Also, they may share that everyone is entitled to produce their own facial emotions regardless of target or background, and their internal states, which are expressed through their facial emotions, should be respected as a part of who they are.
In fact, evidence suggests that North Americans are sensitive to context when there is no agency information. For example, in Ito, Masuda, and Hioki's (2012) recent research, European Canadian participants were asked to categorize, as quickly and accurately as possible, facial emotions presented against a background of landscape scenery. Similar to Masuda and colleagues' research (Masuda, Ellsworth, et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2012) , the emotional undertones of the landscape scenery were either congruent or incongruent with the target facial emotions (e.g., the target's happy facial expression against a beautiful beach vs. the same facial expression shown with a dirty toilet). Following the argument that North Americans, with their low levels of holism, dissociate the target from its context, one might expect North American participants to be unaffected by changes in backgrounds. On the contrary, Ito et al. found the participants' response latency to be significantly influenced by the congruency of the target facial emotions with the emotional undertones of landscape sceneries. Such results give credence to the meaning-based interpretation of the context effect on North Americans' face evaluation, and pose a challenge to the holism interpretation of the issue of face recognition. and the agency explanation are complementary, and that amalgamating the multiple effects of meaning systems provides a better way of comprehensively understanding people's behavior in a given cultural context. However, it is also advisable to decompose, degrade, and particularize the observed effect to articulate the effect of each cultural meaning system. This endeavor is hindered by the failure of past studies to provide evidence of different context effects, by using different types of contextual information.
Because most researchers have used context with either agency or nonagency, it has been difficult to articulate whether, in addition to the holism explanation, the agency explanation is necessary to explain the judgment patterns of targets' facial expression.
Current research contributes to the literature by showing the boundary condition between the two explanations.
Overview and Hypotheses of the Studies
To advance our understanding of the context effect on face evaluation and cultural meaning systems, we examined whether two types of salient context information (the nonagency information of landscape sceneries vs. the agency information of others' facial emotions) differently influence North Americans' intensity ratings of target facial emotions compared with those of East Asians. We compared participants' intensity ratings on facial emotions rather than categorical judgment or response speed to capture subtle yet significant influence of contexts in our daily life. We posit that the agency belief in facial expressions fostered North Americans' tendency to downplay the contextual effect of background facial emotions.
In three studies, European Canadians and East Asians were asked to rate the intensity of happy or sad facial emotions. The affect-provoking landscape sceneries used in Study 1 contained no agent; yet, as previous research has demonstrated (e.g., Ito et al., 2012) , the affective nature of the sceneries was salient enough to influence both North Americans' and East Asians' categorical judgment. We therefore hypothesized that, in this condition, salient landscape information would influence both European Canadians' and East Asians' intensity ratings of the target facial emotions. In Study 2, the target facial emotions were surrounded by facial emotions of others. Similar to Masuda and colleagues' research (Masuda, Ellsworth, et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2012) , the context contained agents different from the target. We therefore hypothesized that, in this condition only, North Americans would downplay salient agent information in the context, because they believe that the target's facial emotions reflect the target's private state of mind. Thus the evaluation of the target's facial emotions would remain the same, regardless of the congruency between facial emotions of the target and background others, because one's facial emotions are considered immune to the facial emotions of others. In Study 3, we attempted to replicate the results of Studies 1 and 2 by combining the procedures of these studies while targeting only North Americans. Using a within-subject design, we examined whether North Americans' evaluation of the target facial emotions was influenced more when the background was nonagentic than when it was agentic. In addition, we included our original questionnaires as well as preexisting cultural scales (e.g., the Analysis-Holism Scale [AHS], the implicit Social Orientation Scale) to examine whether North Americans' beliefs in agency of facial emotions were in fact associated with the differences in their intensity ratings for the two types of context.
Study 1

Method
Participants. Forty-six European Canadian students (27 females and 19 males) and 41
East Asian international students (24 females and 17 males; 20 Chinese, 11 Japanese, 8 Koreans, and 2 others) at the University of Alberta participated in the experiment for part of a course credit. One European Canadian student and 8 East Asian international students were graduate students in departments other than psychology.
Stimuli. We selected 16 target facial portraits that were used in Ito et al.'s (2012) study.
The target portraits showed either happy or sad facial emotion based on the criteria of Ekman and Friesen (1975) . The target portraits varied equally in terms of models' gender (male vs. female) and ethnicity (European American vs. Japanese). European Canadian and Japanese participants in a pre-test reported the equivalent intensity of happiness on four happy European American faces and four happy Asian faces, ts < 1. Similarly for sad faces, the two cultural groups reported the equivalent intensity of sadness, ts < 1.25 p = ns. We selected four positive and four negative images of landscape scenery from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) . Both European Canadian and Japanese participants in a pre-test reported that the mean rating of the feelings elicited by four positive landscapes was significantly more positive than the mean rating of feelings elicited by four negative landscapes (27) = 22.07, p < .001, and (19) = 10.26, p < .001, respectively. 1 We combined landscape images or a blank white background (control group) with each target facial portrait to create 48 experimental stimuli (see Figure 1 ).
Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were asked to read the instructions, which stated that the task was to evaluate the intensity of positive and negative emotions expressed by the target person. Participants were instructed to rate positive intensity ranging from 0
(not at all) to 9 (extremely), followed by negative intensity ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), for each stimulus. Stimuli remained on the monitor until participants finish the two intensity ratings. The instructions were presented in the participants' native language. The first author translated the English version of the instructions into Japanese, and a bilingual research assistant back-translated the instructions. Any discrepancies in the back-translation were resolved through discussions. Experimental stimuli were presented semirandomly using E-prime Version 1.2 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002 ) on a 17-inch monitor at a resolution of 870 × 459 pixels. We first randomly presented target faces combined with affectively salient background landscapes, and subsequently presented the target faces with white backgrounds (i.e., control condition).
Participants sat in front of a computer at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm.
They were given 6 practice trials and subsequently completed 48 experimental trials.
Participants' intensity ratings for each stimulus were recorded. After answering a demographic information questionnaire at the end of the experiment, participants were fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion
We conducted a series of 2 (Culture: European Canadian vs. Japanese) × 3 (Congruency: stimuli by combining target facial portraits with a happy background pair, a sad background pair, or a white blank background. The ethnicity of target portraits and background portraits was the same in one set but was different in the other set (see Figure   4 ). to 9 (extremely) followed by negative intensity ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Stimuli remained on the monitor until participants finish the two intensity ratings. We first randomly presented target faces combined with background faces (i.e., three-person image) and subsequently presented the target faces without background faces (i.e., control condition). Within the block of three-person image, we created two blocks of 16 trials to avoid presenting identical faces consecutively. The order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants. The experimental settings, and the size and the number of stimuli, were identical to those of Study 1. After answering a demographic information questionnaire at the end of the experiment, participants were fully debriefed.
We conducted a series of 2 (Culture: European Canadian vs. Japanese) × 3 (Congruency: Congruent vs. Incongruent vs. Control) ANOVA, with participants' intensity ratings being the dependent variable. Culture was the between-subjects variable,
and Congruency was the within-subject variable. 6 Because the data did not meet the assumption of sphericity for negative ratings on sad target, χ 2 (2) = 13.11, p < .01, and for positive ratings on happy target, χ 2 (2) = 33.36, p < .001, we used the Geisser and Greenhouse (1958) adjusted degrees of freedom to test F value.
For the negative intensity ratings on sad target face, we found a main effect of Culture, F(1, 201) = 22.30, p < .001, η p 2 = .10, and Congruency, F(1.88, 378.02) = 9.41, p < .001, η p 2 = .05, and more important, the significant Culture × Congruency interaction, F(1.88, 378.02) = 3.93, p < .05, η p 2 = .02. Although a main effect of Culture was unexpected, this might reflect cultural differences in avoidance orientation toward potentially harmful stimuli that were prevalent (Hamamura, Meijer, Heine, Kamaya, & Hori, 2009 ). Supporting our hypothesis, within-subject ANOVA for each cultural group showed that the congruency between a target facial emotion and salient valence of surrounding others' facial emotions significantly influenced Japanese participants' ratings, F(1.88, 378.02) = 12.65, p < .001, but not Canadians' ratings, F(1.88, 378.02) = 1.91, p = .17. Simple effect analysis showed that Japanese participants reported that a sad target face surrounded with happy others (i.e., incongruent condition) were less negative than the sad face surrounded with sad others (i.e., congruent condition), F(1, 402) = 12.88, p < .001, or a sad face alone (i.e., the control condition), F(1, 402) = 23.49, p < .001 (see Figure 5 ). Finally, we also added existing self-report measures of cultural orientations to test whether the measures were correlated with the intensity ratings of the targets' facial emotions. Although several researchers have suggested that the correlation between some self-report measures and actual behavioral data is weak (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Kitayama & Uskul, 2011) , self-report measures are often used to search for the meditation effect among variables.
Method
Participants. Twenty-nine European Canadian undergraduate students (14 females and 15 males) at the University of Alberta participated in the experiment for partial fulfillment of a course credit.
Stimuli. When comparing the effect of different types of context, it is crucial that the emotional undertone of the two context types be equivalent. Thus, we conducted a pretest to verify the equivalence of our contextual stimuli. Twenty-three European Canadian undergraduate students were presented with two types of contextual image-landscape and pairs of people-in random order. They were asked to evaluate on 9-point scale-the intensity of valence and intensity of arousal-for each image. A paired-sample t test comparing their responses showed that participants reported equivalent arousal levels between the two types of contextual images, ts < 1. They also reported equivalent negative valence and positive valence, ts < 1.11, ps = ns, between the two types of contextual images. To create stimuli for Study 3, the same 16 target facial emotions used in Studies 1 and 2 were combined with these images of landscapes and pairs of people.
Unlike Studies 1 and 2, we excluded the control condition (i.e., white background). In total, we prepared 128 stimuli that differed in terms of type of context (landscape vs.
surrounding people), valence of context and target (positive vs. negative), and gender and ethnicity of models.
Questionnaires. To measure situated beliefs in agency, we asked participants to report how they felt when the targets' facial emotion was the same as the emotional tone of the background landscape or background people. On bipolar 9-point scales, participants indicated (a) their perceived discomfort, (b) difficulty of judgment, and (c) obscurity of target facial emotion. Based on the definition of agency belief in the present study, we created relative scores for situated agency for background people versus landscape sceneries (i.e., the average ratings when context was pairs of people minus the average ratings when context was landscape sceneries). Higher numbers indicate that participants experienced more discomfort, difficulty of evaluation, and mitigation of facial emotions when they evaluated target faces with background people than with landscape sceneries.
Reliability of these three questions was sufficiently high, Cronbach's alpha = .72 (Stangor, 1998) , and inspection of eigenvalues and the scree plot suggested a one-factor model; thus, we averaged the scores for each participant.
We also included several questionnaires that might uncover an explanatory variable for European Canadians' tendency to ignore contexts with identifiable agents.
These questionnaires were chosen as they pertain to North Americans' perception, Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants evaluated the intensity of the target person's positive and negative expressions. They were instructed to rate positive intensity, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), followed by negative intensity, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Stimuli remained on the monitor until participants finished the two intensity ratings. To avoid the effect of participants' fatigue, we created two equal sets of 64 stimuli that were counterbalanced between participants.
Within each set, there were an equal number of target faces with landscape sceneries and with pairs of people; the order of presenting the two context types was also counterbalanced between participants. That is, half of the participants first rated target facial emotions against landscape backgrounds, and then rated target facial emotions with pairs of people in the background. The order was reversed for the other participants. At the end of the experimental sessions, participants answered a battery of questionnaires. Canadian participants' evaluations of sad target faces were influenced by the emotional undertone of landscape sceneries significantly more than that of background people, t(28) = 2.23, p < .05. Their evaluations of happy target faces were also more influenced by the emotional undertone of landscape sceneries than that of background people, although the effect was marginal, t(28) = 1.71, p =.10 (see Figure 7 ).
Results
Response
12
Explanatory factors for the effect of context types. We observed that although European
Canadians took contexts without identifiable agents into account, they tended to downplay contexts with identifiable agents. To test the underlying factors, we first calculated the ratings for the congruent condition minus the ratings for the incongruent condition for each context type, to represent the effect of congruency of affective information. A larger number indicates the perception of more intense target emotions when the emotional undertone of the background was congruent rather than incongruent with the target face. Then, we subtracted this intensity rating for background people trials from the rating for background landscape trials. The resulting intensity ratings represented the relative impact of context types on participants' evaluation of sad or happy facial emotion. Finally, we regressed each intensity rating with the four measures of possible underlying factors. As shown in Table 1 , the Situated Agency Scale was the only measure that was significantly associated with the relative impacts of context types on sad target faces, β =.69, t(28) =4.13, p < .01, and happy target faces β = .42, t(28) = 2.10, p < .05. That is, European Canadians who reported higher discomfort, higher difficulty of evaluation, and higher obscurity for evaluating target faces surrounded by other faces were more likely to downplay the emotional undertone of surrounding others and to take into account that of landscape sceneries.
General Discussion
As previous findings have suggested, the results of the present studies indicate that contextual information influences facial emotion judgment. However, the condition in which the context is informative is highly dependent on the meaning of facial emotions shared by people in a given society. Both European Canadians and East Asians reported that the intensity of target facial emotions in affectively congruent contexts was higher than that in affectively incongruent contexts when the contextual information lacked identifiable agents (Study 1). However, when the target facial emotions were surrounded by agents (Study 2), European Canadians were not affected by such a manipulation, suggesting that they were able to sort out where such affective sources derived from. In support of our hypothesis, European Canadians dissociated background facial emotions from the target person's internal state of mind, and thus, the background facial emotions were perceived as less important information for understanding the target facial emotions.
However, European Canadians did incorporate the affective information of landscape sceneries in the evaluation of target facial emotions. The Study 3 results showed that this tendency was especially strong for those European Canadians who considered facial emotions as individuals' volitional and intentional actions. Several implications of the current studies are discussed below.
Cultural Variations in Perception of Agency
In the past, the idea that humans are attentive to agency produced a variety of social-psychological research in Western societies, in areas such as dispositional attributions (Jones & Harris, 1967) ; moral judgment based on the justice principle (Kohlberg, 1976) ; and the effect of personal choice on motivation (Bandura, 1982) .
Recent findings in cultural psychology, however, have shown that findings regarding the perception of individuals as free agents might be specific to Western populations (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010 , for a review). For example, compared with their Western counterparts, Koreans and Japanese were less likely to attribute the cause of one's actions to personal disposition (Choi et al., 1999) ; Indians were more likely to perceive a conflict as the violation of interpersonal expectations rather than violation of justice (Miller & Bersoff, 1992) ; and Asian American children were more motivated to perform a task chosen by their parents, rather than a task chosen by the children themselves (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) . The current findings are given credence by these studies.
In what situation, then, do East Asians perceive agency? Evidence from other research indicates that East Asians perceive agency in the social groups to which people belong, rather than in individuals. For example, newspaper articles in Japan were likely to attribute causes of corporate scandals to organizational characteristics rather than to traits of individual workers (Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999) ; and Chinese commercial arbitrators were likely to attribute organizations' violations of contract terms to internal, rather than external, causes (Friedman, Liu, Chen, & Chi, 2007) . In addition, as a result of emphasizing agency of the social group, East Asians were more likely than their European American counterparts to consider members of the social group as sharing similar characteristics (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, Hamilton, Peng, & Wang, 2007) . The current findings shed light on this aspect again and provide researchers with directions for future research to further elucidate the relationship between culture and agency.
Amalgamation Versus Particularization of Meaning Systems
For more than two decades, cultural psychologists have meticulously depicted cultural variations in psychological processes by using dichotomous explanations of culturally shared beliefs, such as individualism versus collectivism, independent versus interdependent self-construals, and holistic versus analytic thoughts. Morling and Masuda (2012) recently reviewed these works and maintained that some psychological phenomena could be interpreted as the amalgamation of more than one belief. For example, many researchers reported that the contrast between holistic and analytic thoughts, together with the contrast between interdependent and independent selfconstruals, can complementarily help explain cultural phenomena such as fundamental attribution errors (Choi et al., 1999) ; self-awareness (Cohen & Hoshino-Browne, 2005) ;
and social influence and power (Miyamoto & Ji, 2011; Morling et al., 2002) . In general, these researchers discussed the influence of two dimensions: (a) interdependence and holistic perception and (b) independence and analytic perception. Thus, "if one perceives oneself as embedded within a large context of which one is an interdependent part, it is likely that other objects or events will be perceived in a similar way" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 246) ; we call such phenomena the amalgamation of meaning systems.
Attention to context also resonates with a holistic understanding of the world, in which everything in the world is related to each other and no single element can be logically viewed as acting independently of anything else (Nisbett, 2003) .
However, in the present studies, we examined the issue of mixed cultural beliefs by applying an alternative methodology to them and by articulating which of the cultural beliefs played a crucial role in creating cultural variation in psychological processes. In fact, previous research into Japanese people's tendency to attend to surrounding others (e.g., Masuda, Ellsworth, et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2012) did not clearly differentiate the explanation of interdependent self-construals from that of holistic attention. Thus, the question of whether cultural variation in context sensitivity can be interpreted as simply a matter of degree, contingent on one's level of holistic tendency-or whether it should be considered a qualitative difference in the perception of agency, based on variations in cultural beliefs regarding self-construal-has not been addressed previously. To solve this problem, we conducted a series of cross-cultural and mono-cultural studies in which we presented salient backgrounds so that all participants would be easily influenced by them. We thus succeeded in focusing only on the discussion of cultural variation in construal-that is, the issue of whether the perception of agency influenced one's pattern of attention. We maintain that this experimental design can be called the particularization of meaning systems, as opposed to the amalgamation of meaning systems. We believe that this research design can be applied to a variety of research topics to further scrutinize a variety of unresolved questions in the field of cultural psychology, thus allowing researchers to further unpack the relationship between cultural meaning systems and psychological processes.
Automatic Versus Deliberate Processes of Judging Facial Emotions in Context
The current studies attempted to scrutinize cultural similarities and differences in the process of facial emotion perception by asking participants to engage in the evaluation tasks under the experimental manipulation. However, there is an apparent discrepancy between the current findings and the findings of our previous studies. Ito et al.'s (2012) previous findings indicated that the emotional undertone of landscape backgrounds and facial emotion backgrounds equally influenced European Canadian and Japanese participants' response speed to categorize facial emotions. The results of the present studies, by contrast, suggest that such culturally similar processes were attenuated when people engage in more time-consuming processes of facial emotion evaluation, such as intensity ratings of target facial emotions. We speculate that, in general, the salient background information influences the judgment of both Canadians and Japanese.
However, in the intensity rating task, the time lag between the stimulus onset and the judgment allowed participants to allocate their cognitive capacity to interpreting the meaning of the stimuli, which would in turn allow them to deliberately access the culturally dominant meaning system in their society. That is, as a default pattern of facial emotion judgment, both North Americans' and East Asians' categorical judgments were equally influenced by changes in extremely salient context. However, North Americans, but not East Asians, suppress the activated information of surrounding others' facial emotions, because they believe that one's facial expression derives mainly from internal factors rather than others' emotions. Although such speculations are beyond the scope of the present studies, the findings shed light on the processes of automatic versus deliberate information processing during the facial emotion judgment.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current research has several limitations. First, the East Asian groups who were the comparison groups differed between Studies 1 and 2. However, the focus of this study is North Americans' belief in agency of facial emotions, and we maintain that Asian international students in Canada and Japanese students in Japan both provided a valid comparison to show the distinctiveness of European Canadians compared with people from other cultural backgrounds. Second, we were unable to control for the size of the context stimuli. Although the intensities of affective information in the two types of contexts were equally salient (see Study 3), the background faces were significantly smaller than the landscape sceneries. Therefore, it is possible that North Americans failed to notice the changes in facial emotions of background people. To avoid such failure, we asked participants whether they noticed that the target facial emotions and contexts (i.e., background people or landscape sceneries) differed in affective information at the end of the experiment. All participants reported that they noticed the differences. Therefore, we argue that European Canadian participants in Study 3 intentionally downplayed background facial emotions in their target face evaluation. However, because the size of context stimuli covaried with the two context types, further research is needed to test the effect with nonagent context stimuli that is the same size as a face. Finally, as other research suggests (Kitayama & Uskul, 2011) , the correlation between the existing selfreport measures and the intensity judgments of the target facial emotions was very weak.
Although the self-report measures were often used as the meditational variables of cultural variation in human behaviors, the discrepancies between the abstract questions in the measures and the concrete behavior patterns seem to be substantial. This observation strongly resonates with the discussion of attitude-behavior discrepancy (e.g., Insko, Blake, Cialdini, & Mulaik, 1970) . However, recent neuroscientific evidence shows a positive correlation between self-report measures and neural data (Na et al., 2010) . Our findings suggest that there must be unknown confounding variables that may constrain participants' behavioral patterns (e.g., judgement, reaction time). In future studies, the relationship between attitude, behavior, and neural responses must be comprehensively investigated while controlling potential confounding variables associated with each measurement.
Notes
1. Please see Ito, Masuda, and Hioki (2012) for the detailed procedure of the pre-test.
2. Ratings that were 3 SD away from the condition mean (2.14%) were replaced with the condition mean.
3. For the positive rating on sad target faces, we found a main effect of Congruency, participants' intensity ratings being the dependent variable. Culture and ethnicity of models were the between-subjects variable, and congruency was the within-subject variable. We found neither significant main effects nor interactions involving ethnicity of models, Fs < 1.79, p = ns; thus, we excluded the ethnicity of models from the following analyses and will not discuss it further.
6. Ratings that were 3 SD away from the condition mean (0.63%) were replaced with the condition mean.
7. For the positive intensity rating on sad target faces, we found a main effect of 9. Responses that were 3 SD away from the condition mean (1.87%) were replaced with the condition mean.
10. Ratings that were 3 SD away from the condition mean (2.35%) were replaced with the condition mean.
11. For the positive intensity rating on sad target faces, we found a main effect of . Differences in the effect of congruency manipulation on participants' sad target evaluation and happy target evaluation with landscape sceneries or background faces as context. Note: Congruency effect was calculated by subtracting intensity ratings for incongruent conditions from intensity ratings for congruent conditions. Error bars represent one standard error away from the condition means. *p < .10. **p < .05.
Note: AHS = Analysis-Holism Scale; ISOQ = Implicit Social Orientation
Questionnaire.
***p < .01. **p < .05 . Differences in the effect of congruency manipulation on participants' sad target evaluation and happy target evaluation with landscape sceneries or background faces as context. Note: Congruency effect was calculated by subtracting intensity ratings for incongruent conditions from intensity ratings for congruent conditions. Error bars represent one standard error away from the condition means. *p < .10. **p < .05.
